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In this paper we review and comment on “A novel protocol-authentication algorithm
ruling out a man-in-the-middle attack in quantum cryptography”, [M. Peev et al., Int.
J. Quant. Inform., 3, 225, (2005)]. In particular, we point out that the proposed primi-
tive is not secure when used in a generic protocol, and needs additional authenticating
properties of the surrounding quantum-cryptographic protocol .
Keywords: Quantum Cryptography; Quantum Key Distribution; Authentication
1. Introduction
Quantum Cryptography, or more accurately Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), is
an unconditionally secure key growing technique based on the principles of quantum
mechanics. It is unconditionally secure because no quantum state can be copied or
measured without disturbing it. However, the practical implementation of QKD
protocols requires an immutable public channel. In case the public channel is not
immutable, the eavesdropper (Eve) can easily mount a man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attack, since Eve is in control of both the quantum and the public channels. For the
attack to be successful Eve needs, among other things, to substitute the classical
message from one legitimate user (Alice) to the other (Bob) without being noticed.
To prohibit such an attack on QKD, proper message authentication is needed.
Therefore, QKD is secure only if it is combined with an unconditionally secure
message authentication scheme. In this paper we will review a recently proposed
authentication primitive1 and point out that it is not secure when used in a generic
QKD system. It has earlier been shown2 that an attack is possible against the
“privacy amplification” step in a QKD protocol using the proposed authentication,
but the attack presented here is more serious and enables a full MITM attack on
the whole system, unless some additional part of the protocol has authenticating
properties.
1
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2. The proposed authentication primitive
In Ref. 1, the authors propose an authentication primitive which aims at decreas-
ing the key consumption for the authentication purposes in QKD, and in turn to
improve the efficiency of the key growth in QKD. The algorithm works as follows.
Let M be the set of all binary strings of length m (or the set of all messages of
length m), and let T be the set of all binary strings of length n with n < m (or the
set of all tags of length n). A message mA is first mapped fromM to Z, where Z is
the set of all binary strings of length r with n < r < m, by a single publicly known
hash function f so that zA = f(mA). And then, zA is mapped by a secret hk ∈ HZ
to a tag tA = hk(zA), where HZ : Z 7→ T is a Strongly Universal2 (SU2) family
of hash functions3 and the subscript k is the secret key needed to identify a hash
function. The message-tag pair mA + tA will be sent over the public channel. To
authenticate the message mA ∈ M, the legitimate receiver computes hk(f(mA))
and compares it to tA. If they are identical then the message will be accepted as
authentic, otherwise it will be rejected. Since r is fixed independently of m, the key
length required for authentication is constant regardless of the message length to
be authenticated.
This authentication algorithm is claimed1 to be secure with a probability ǫ of
Eve being able to create the correct tag for her fake message. In Ref. 1, this is
calculated asa
ǫ = ǫ1 + ǫ2 (1)
where ǫ2 = 1/|T | which is the probability of guessing the correct tag when a SU2
hash function family is used and ǫ1 is the probability that the message mA and
Eve’s modified message mE(6= mA) yield the same value under the publicly known
hash function f .
3. The problem
This authentication primitive is such that whenever Eve’s message mE happens to
coincide with Alice’s message mA under the publicly known hash function f , i.e.
f(mE) = f(mA), Eve can just send mE + tA since tE = tA. The problem here is
that in Ref. 1 security is derived under the explicit assumption that Eve has a fixed
message. The result holds, but in generic QKD Eve is not restricted to one message
mE.
In a full MITM attack on a QKD protocol, Eve impersonates Bob to Alice and
Alice to Bob during the quantum transmission process and the subsequent public
discussions. We use BB844 with simple reconciliation and privacy amplification; and
immediate authentication of each phase as our first example. This would consist
of, in order, raw key generation; sifting and immediate authentication; one-way
error correction and immediate authentication; one-way privacy amplification and
aActually, ǫ ≤ ǫ1 + ǫ2; eqn. (1) is an upper bound rather than an equality.
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authentication (see, e.g., Ref. 5 Chapter 12). Eve receives and measures the qubits
that Alice has sent to Bob, in her choice of basis. We note here that although QKD
requires that Bob randomly selects the basis to measure the qubits in, Eve can
ignore this requirement. At the same time she chooses a set of qubits in, again, not
necessarily random states and sends these to Bob. After Bob receives and measures
the qubits sent by Eve in a randomly selected basis, he sends an authenticated
time stamp to Alice to end the quantum transmission phase. Now Alice sends
her message mA, which contains the settings used for encoding/decoding on the
quantum channel, along with the authentication tag tA to Bob. Eve intercepts the
message-tag pair and calculates f(mA) and compares it with f(mE). In the rare
event that they are equal, Eve can just send mE + tA to Bob. Otherwise, she can
change her message mE which contains the settings. Changing one of the settings,
i.e., changing one bit of the message, will at most introduce one noisy bit in the
sifted key. Even a few noisy bits will not make a noticeable effect in practical QKD
systems because of the error correction used in the reconciliation step.
In this situation, if f(mE) 6= f(mA), Eve can search for a message m
′
E with
dHamming(mE,m
′
E) = 1 (or “small”) such that f(m
′
E) = f(mA). In other words, she
tries to find a collision between mA and m
′
E under f such that m
′
E is close to mE,
and it is well known that such collisions may exist for many hash functions and in
fact do exist for well-known examples6,7. Eve can now send the message-tag pair
m′E + tA knowing that Bob will accept the message m
′
E as authentic.
Searching for a collision requires Eve to have sufficient computing power, but
usually in QKD no bounds are assumed on Eve’s computing power. One should also
note that the computing power needed may be lower than one would first expect6,7.
However, even without sufficient computing power, Eve can make a list of different
values of m′E and the corresponding value of z
′
E = f(m
′
E) ∈ Z in advance, and save
it in her device. Remember that the usual requirement of having random settings
(making the messagemE random) does not apply to Eve; the requirement is needed
to ensure that the final key is secret, something that Eve can ignore. With a pre-
chosen mE, a list of pairs (m
′
E, z
′
E) and her received mA+ tA, Eve can just compute
zA = f(mA) and pick m
′
E from her list corresponding to zA, and then send m
′
E+tA.
She can even make a partial list, and simply wait for the first match to occur. In
fact, the parameter ǫ1, now interpreted as the probability that some item in Eve’s
list collides with mA, depends linearly on the size of this list. If she is able to make a
full list (one message m′E for each possible zA), or has sufficient computing power,
she is certain of success in the sifting phase every time she performs the MITM
attack.
Eve now has two sets of sifted keys, one shared with Alice and the other with
Bob. The remaining steps are one-way error correction and authentication; and
one-way privacy amplification and authentication. These are completed by sending
random parity maps over the classical channel, and in case of error correction
also the parity values 8,9,10,11. In the case of error correction, Eve intercepts the
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authenticated error-correction information (random maps and the output values)
sent by Alice to Bob, and error-corrects the sifted key that she shares with Alice.
She then searches for non-random maps (and corresponding output) of the sifted
key shared with Bob, that makes her message collide with Alice’s under f . Note that
Eve at this point may change any bit of the sifted key at the price of introducing an
extra bit error in the sifted key. This will enable a collision even if all the possible
maps do not. She sends the resulting message to Bob along with Alice’s tag, which
will then be accepted by Bob. Bob responds by an authenticated message that
signals which subsets matched and which subsets were successfully error-corrected,
and also indicates the error rate of the sifted key; in this simple scheme this is used
as error estimate. Eve modifies her corresponding but still waiting response to Alice
so that it will collide with Bob’s message under f . This may introduce some noise
into the error-corrected key shared between Alice and Eve, but this goes unnoticed
by Alice unless an extra detection phase is present (see below).
The privacy amplification is performed by Alice choosing a random map, and
sending that over the classical channel, whereafter Alice and Bob apply this map
to their respective reconciled keys. Here, Eve intercepts the description of the map
and the tag, and privacy amplifies the reconciled key (shared with Alice) using
the received map. She then searches for a new non-random map to use for privacy
amplification with Bob that makes the message coincide with Alice’s under f . If
Eve arranges for the reconciled key shared with Alice to be of equal length to that
shared with Bob, she can even reuse the map that Alice sent. Then, Eve sends
the chosen map along with Alice’s tag to Bob, who will accept them and privacy
amplify his error-corrected key accordingly.
4. Countermeasures
The situation is improved if postponed authentication is used, or for example, when
using iterative reconciliation methods. More precisely, if the messages are sent in
each phase as usual (sifting, error correction and privacy amplification, etc.) but not
authenticated until the end of the round, then Eve’s freedom to change her message
is restricted to the message part in the last phase. And this severely restricts Eve’s
possibilities, even though an attack is still possible as is shown in Ref. 2.
Another more effective improvement is to use secret key in an additional phase
of the protocol. There is no explicit mention of using more secret key for this pur-
pose in Ref. 1 but it is implicit; it is present in their reference 5 (here Ref. 12).
The procedure basically uses already shared secret key to choose a hash function
to detect errors in the reconciled key. Another suggestion is to one-time pad the
reconciliation procedure13. Both of these suggestions are intended to keep the in-
formation leaked in error correction at a minimum, but they also implicitly add an
authentication property of that phase. Using a modification like this will probably
improve the situation but the needed formal proof is beyond the scope of this paper.
It is perhaps important to note that this puts stronger requirements on the extra
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cryptographic primitives used since they are used as authentication in addition to
limiting the information leakage. But, since the mentioned modifications both use
cryptographically secure primitives, it is to be expected that they are resilient to
extra demands of this type.
5. Conclusion
This brief review of a proposed authentication algorithm intended to rule out a
man-in-the-middle attack in QKD shows that the proposed method is insecure
when used in a generic QKD protocol. The main problem is that Eve is not limited
to a fixed (random) message, but can in fact choose what message to send, and
can check if her chosen message gives the same tag as Alice’s message, since the
first-step hash function f is publicly known.
Using extra shared secret key for an extra authentication in one of the phases
probably improves the situation, but it should be stressed that, unlike Wegman-
Carter authentication, the security of the proposed authentication procedure is
highly dependent of the context in which the authentication is applied.
Therefore, in general, great care should be taken when authentication primitives
used in the context of QKD are not information-theoretically secure.
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